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Most contemporary accounts of the nature of faith explicitly defend 
what we call ‘the positivity theory of faith’ – the theory that faith must 
be accompanied by a favourable evaluative belief, or a desire 
towards the object of faith. This paper examines the different varieties 
of the positivity theory and the arguments used to support it. Whilst 
initially plausible, we find that the theory faces numerous problematic 
counterexamples, and show that weaker versions of the positivity 
theory are ultimately implausible. We discuss a distinct property of 
faith that we call ‘true grit’, such that faith requires one to be resilient 
toward the evidential, practical, and psychological challenges that it 
faces. We show how true grit is necessary for faith, and provides a 
simpler and less problematic explanation of the evidence used to 
support the positivity theory. 
 







Does faith require a positive attitude towards the object of faith? That is, 
does faith require that one desire or approve of the object of one’s faith, or 
regard it as a good or desirable thing? Accounts of faith that endorse this 
position, which we will call positivity theories, are prevalent in recent 
literature in the field. A widely canvassed type of argument for positivity 
theory appeals to examples that appear to show that faith, in contrast with 
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belief or acceptance, must be accompanied by a positive attitude. For 
example, 
 
1. Ava believes in ghosts. 
2. Ava believes that Donald Trump will win a second term in 2020. 
 
are attitudes that Ava could have even if she thought that ghosts are 
malevolent beings, or that Trump winning a second term would be a bad 
thing. In contrast,  
 
3. Ava has faith in ghosts. 
4. Ava has faith that Donald Trump will win a second term in 2020. 
 
seem to require that Ava positively evaluate ghosts or Trump winning. 
Moreover, expressions of faith directed toward objects that the speaker 
does not consider favourably such as  
 
5. I have faith in our impending demise. 
6. I have faith that Donald Trump will destroy the world. 
 
look like infelicitous or inapt things to say. The positivity theory is usually 
advanced with some version of these arguments. The theory is sometimes 
restricted to significant varieties of faith, such as religious or propositional 
faith, and there are differences in how the positive valency metaphor is 
cashed out, be it in terms of desires or evaluative beliefs. However, most 
recent accounts of faith support a version of positivity theory; no 
contemporary account, to our knowledge, rejects it. 
 
We will review in section one the positivity thesis in its different forms and 
in section two the arguments put forward in its defence. We agree that faith 
and a positive evaluation of its content are closely associated but argue, 
partly on the basis of counterexamples set out in section three, that this is 
a contingent rather than a necessary relation. While there are some fallback 
positions available to the theory, which we will explore in section four, the 
proposed necessary connection between faith and a positive evaluation of 
its object or content should be rejected. Moreover, in section five, we argue 
that there are other widely acknowledged properties of faith that provide a 
simpler explanation for why faith often goes along with a positive attitude. 
Specifically, a property of faith we call true grit: its relationship with a 
disposition to resist epistemic, practical and psychological considerations 
to give up on the object or content of faith. True grit, we argue, does justice 
to both the examples and intuitions that motivate positivity theory without 
the requirement that faith be accompanied by a positive attitude. 
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1. What is Positivity Theory? 
 
Positivity theories are commonly focussed on propositional faith, where 
faith is an attitude with a propositional content; for example, faith that God 
is good, that Brazil will win the World Cup, or that things will turn out 
well. According to Robert Audi: 
 
even if propositional faith is not reducible to a kind of belief, it 
is reducible to a complex of beliefs and attitudes, for example 
to some degree of belief that p and a positive attitude toward 
p’s being the case. (2011, 79) 
 
As Audi indicates here, positivity is seen as a way to distinguish faith from 
cognate propositional attitudes such as belief.1 Positivity theory is also 
often advanced for objectual faith, or faith-in S, where faith has a non-
propositional object such as a person, an institution, or political system. 
According to Audi: 
 
There is a further characteristic (already foreshadowed) of both 
propositional and…[objectual] faith. Both require a positive 
evaluative attitude toward their object. (2011, 67) 
 
Others who take positive valency as essential for faith include William 
Alston (1996, 12), Lara Buchak (2014, 53), Daniel Howard-Snyder (2017, 
56-57), Walter Kaufman (1958, 113) and John Schellenberg (2005, 133). 
Less boldly, Daniel McKaughan (2018, 198) says positivity is a 
characteristic of ‘paradigm cases’ of faith-that and faith-in. Alvin 
Plantinga, mainly concerned with Christian faith, claims that someone with 
Christian faith ‘(paradigmatically) finds the whole scheme of salvation 
enormously attractive, delightful, moving, a source of amazed 
wonderment’ (2000, 292). Although ‘paradigmatic’ is open to 
interpretation, we take this to be the view that positivity is necessary for 




1 Whether propositional faith requires belief or, more modestly, acceptance, is a matter of contention. 
On a standard view, to accept a proposition is to use it as if it were true in one’s theoretical and practical 
reasoning (Cohen 1992; Jackson forthcoming); one can choose to accept p even if one does not believe 
it to be true. The accounts of acceptance somewhat differ, however. Even though Alston’s (1996) 
account of acceptance draws from Cohen (1992), he diverges from Cohen by maintaining that 
acceptance is ‘not just on an "as if" basis… To accept [p] is to accept [p] as true’ (18), rather than 
accepting p as if p were true. For the purposes of evaluating the positivity theory, whether faith requires 
belief or acceptance is not crucial: comparable arguments and examples about the differences between 
faith and belief can be constructed for faith and acceptance. For simplicity, therefore, we will take 
belief to be the cognitive constituent of faith. 
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Alston draws attention to two different ways in which faith is positive. He 
notes that merely believing p can be considered a ‘positive attitude’ 
towards p (Alston 1996, 12) but the positivity of faith is something 
different: 
 
It necessarily involves some pro-attitude toward its object. If S 
is said to have faith that democracy will eventually be firmly 
established everywhere, that implies not only that S believes 
that this will happen but that S looks on this prospect with 
favor. If S were strongly opposed to universal democracy, it 
would be somewhere between inapt and false to represent S as 
having faith that democracy will triumph. Whereas one can 
truly and unproblematically be said to believe that democracy 
will win out even if one views the prospect with horror. (Alston 
1996, 12)2 
 
Let’s call the positivity of belief B-positivity. In what way is B-positivity 
positive? What Alston has in mind, we take it, is that believing p to be true 
includes, among many other things, the disposition to use p in one’s 
reasoning and to endorse or assert p in various circumstances. Belief that 
p is thereby ‘positive’ because the believer is disposed to rely on and agree 
with it.3 In contrast, disbelief goes along with the ‘negative’ dispositions 
to disagree with and reject p. However, as Alston makes clear, the kind of 
positive attitude that he is interested in is not B-positivity. Audi makes a 
similar point: 
 
If I have faith that God loves human beings, I have not just a 
cognitive attitude (the kind that, like belief, may be called true 
or false), but something more: a certain positive disposition 
toward the state of affairs being so, i.e. actually obtaining 
(toward the truth of the proposition, in another 
terminology). (Audi 2011, 54) 
 
Call this second kind of positivity F-positivity. F-positivity and B-
positivity are distinct properties. B-positivity towards p is not only 
compatible with a lack of F-positivity towards p, but also a negative 
evaluation of p. So, someone who believes that democracy will be 
universally established is B-positive towards that proposition but may be 
entirely neutral about that prospect or even, as Alston notes, ‘regard it with 
 
2 As noted in footnote 1, Alston’s view is that faith requires either belief or acceptance.  
3 In line with fn. 1 above, a similar positive attitude may characterise acceptance; acceptance that p 
similarly involves the disposition to use p in one’s reasoning and to endorse or assert p under various 
circumstances and so may similarly be understood to share B-positivity. Indeed, although Alston 
presents positivity as a characteristic of belief, he endorses an acceptance theory of faith (Alston 1996). 
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horror’ (cf. also Howard-Snyder, 2019, 5). It is F-positivity that is being 
posited in the positivity theory and that is the focus of these arguments and 
of this paper. 
 
What, then, is F-positivity? For Alston, it is ‘some pro-attitude towards its 
object’. Here are some other proposals: 
 
This is an attitude of a kind that at least normally has 
motivational as well as cognitive elements. The point is 
(roughly) that faith that something will occur entails taking that 
to be a good thing. (Audi 2011, 67) 
 
A positive conative orientation toward the object of faith 
consists in being for its truth, favoring its being the case, 
wanting it to be so, giving its truth a positive evaluation, 
regarding it as good or desirable, and the like. (Howard-Snyder 
2017, 48) 
 
some sort of…positive affective-evaluative attitude toward the 
person or content that is the object of one’s faith…someone 
who has faith that God exists or that God will be faithful to such 
and such promises will care about whether the propositions in 
question are true, will want them to be the case, or will consider 
the truth of these propositions or the obtaining of these states 
of affairs to be good or desirable. (McKaughan 2018, 198) 
 
And according to John Schellenberg  
 
it seems possible to develop examples of cases where one has 
faith that p without a desire that p be true. Accordingly, so as 
not to be misleading, I suggest that we avoid the notion of a 
pro-attitude and instead deploy the weaker notion of a 
favourable evaluation of the state of affairs reported by p (and, 
by extension, of the truth of p). This is entailed by faith that p. 
(2005, 133) 
 
There are significant differences in these accounts of F-positivity. To see 
this, consider some different options for analysing the belief/desire 
constituents of F-positivity.4 Suppose that R has faith that p (or faith in s). 
On a belief theory of F-positivity: 
 
4 This paper will follow these authors in working within the framework of Humean or belief-desire 
psychology that distinguishes between beliefs and desires as categories of mental state with distinct 
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BEL: R believes that p is good or that it is desirable that p be 
true (or believes that s is good or desirable). 
 
And according to the desire theory of F-positivity: 
 
DES: R desires that p or approves of p (or desires/approves of 
s). 
 
Either one of these conditions could be understood as providing a complete 
analysis of positivity, as follows:  
 
X-BEL: Only BEL is true 
X-DES: Only DES is true 
 
There are also two obvious ways of combining them:  
 
CON: Both BEL and DES are true 
 
DIS: Either BEL or DES are true 
 
Alston is completely clear on where he stands, at least with respect to 
propositional faith. He supports a pure desire account, i.e. X-DES. Audi 
proposes that the positivity of faith only requires one to regard the object 
of faith as a good thing, which he seems to allow could be either an 
evaluative belief or a desire. Schellenberg clearly rejects X-DES but his 
preferred notion of ‘favourable evaluation’ appears to encompass either 
desire or belief. So, we take both authors to support DIS. In other work, 
Howard-Snyder (2013, 367) adopts a varied stance towards positivity, and 
so is likely also a supporter of DIS. Similarly, McKaughan also gives space 
to positive evaluations that could be interpreted as either desires or beliefs 
about p (i.e. as approving of p or believing that p is a good thing).  
 
There is a reason for thinking, contrary to X-DES and CON, that F-
positivity need not be a desire-like attitude. Adapting an example from 
John Schellenberg, imagine that Paul is a supporter of a political party and 
places his faith in its leadership. Following a leadership contest, not only 
does Paul’s preferred candidate fail to win, the successful candidate is 
someone that Paul finds both personally repellent and morally 
 
dispositional profiles. This is sometimes put in terms of direction of fit. Desires (and desire-like states 
such as wishes, hopes, plans and so on) have a world-to-mind direction of fit: the agent desires to bring 
the world into accordance with the content of the desire. Beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit: 
the content of the belief should fit with the way that the world is. Desires, unlike beliefs, are taken to 
motivate the agent to bring about action.  
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reprehensible. Despite his misgivings and resentment of the candidate’s 
success, Paul recognises that the new leader is the best prospect for 
achieving the aspirations of the political party. Accordingly, Paul 
maintains his faith in the leadership, and loyally commits to campaign for 
it. As Schellenberg points out, faith can be positive by virtue of recognising 
that the object of faith is desirable without any favourable feelings towards 
it: ‘something may intellectually be seen as desirable – as worthy of desire 
– without actually being desired, when relevant psychological obstacles 
are present’ (2005, 133). 
 
For these reasons, we take the positivity theorists to be committed to (at 
least) the more modest DIS. The availability of plausible counterexamples 
to X-DES and CON make DIS the more plausible position.5  
To sum up, positivity theorists support a theory on the following lines: 
 
Positivity Theory (PT). Necessarily, if R has faith that p (or in 
s) then R desires that or approves of p (or desires or approves 
of s), or believes that p (or s) is good or desirable. 
 
Additionally, some restrict PT to religious faith or to paradigm cases of 
faith.  
 
Before proceeding, we need one further distinction. It is very widely held 
that faith motivates the agent with faith (e.g. Bishop 2007, 117; Howard-
Snyder 2017, 56-57; Schellenberg 2005, 127-66; Swinburne 2001, 211). 
This theory, which we will call faith internalism,6 in its simplest form says 
that 
 
Necessarily, if R has faith that p or faith in s, then R is (to some 
extent) motivated to act on that faith. 
 
Now, faith internalism could dovetail with PT in the following way. 
Suppose that the motivation to act is explained by the presence of a desire-
like, or evaluative state, in line with Humean psychology (see footnote 4). 
It follows from faith internalism that faith must be accompanied by a 
desire-like attitude. This affords a neat way of bringing together positivity 
theory and faith internalism: the desire towards or approval of the object 
of faith posited by PT could also motivate the agent. Audi (2011, 67, cf. 
also Howard-Snyder 2019, 3) appears to suggest this connection. Faith 
internalism and positivity theory are clearly distinct theories. However, 
 
5 Note that if the F-positivity of propositional faith is cashed out as an evaluative belief, it will involve 
two positive cognitive attitudes: belief in the propositional content (which is B-positive) and belief that 
that the content is good (which is F-positive). 
6 For an overview of a comparable current debate in metaethics see Björnsson et. al. (2015). 
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since the connections between them play a role in later discussion it is 
useful to make clear at this stage that these theories are independent. There 
are three main reasons for this. 
 
First, PT can be satisfied by faith being accompanied by evaluative beliefs 
(i.e. BEL) about the object of faith rather than desires. So, positivity theory 
(assuming, again Humean psychology) is compatible with faith being 
motivationally inert. Second, the desire-like state that motivates the agent 
with faith does not have to be about the object of faith, as PT requires. 
Suppose that Jane has faith that Brazil will win the next World Cup. She 
enthusiastically supports the team but she is motivated by a desire to please 
her father (who is a big supporter of the Brazilian team) rather than a desire 
that the team wins. She may not be aware that this is the desire that 
motivates her. Her psychological state satisfies faith internalism – she 
supports the team – but not PT because her motivating desire is not directed 
towards the content of faith. Third, faith internalism does not require that 
the desire-like state that motivates the agent with faith is positive. Suppose, 
to take a minor variation on our example, that Jane is motivated by a fear 
of her father’s displeasure (and he would be displeased if Brazil lost). 
Again, she may not be aware that this is the desire that is motivating her to 
support the team. Unlike PT, faith internalism is not picky on the kind of 
attitude that motivates the agent to act on her faith. The attitude does not 
have to be positive evaluation or approval – it could be fear, selfishness, 
vanity, etc. – provided that it disposes the agent to act on that faith. 
 
It can be seen, therefore, that while an agent whose faith involves a positive 
and motivating evaluation of the object of faith will satisfy both PT and 
faith internalism, these two theories are independent.  
 
 
2. Arguments for the Positivity of Faith 
 
A useful initial classification among the arguments advanced for positivity 
theory is between those that exploit (a) examples of the kinds of attitudes 
that are appropriately regarded as faith, and (b) examples that contrast faith 
with related attitudes. 
 
Examples of (a) are found in the writings of Walter Kaufmann, one of the 
first philosophers to draw attention to positivity: ‘One can say: “I have faith 
I shall recover.” One cannot say, without doing violence to language: “I 
have faith that I have cancer.”’ (1958, 113). Lara Buchak takes a similar 
approach. According to Buchak, 
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in order for a proposition to be a potential object of faith [...] 
the individual must have a positive attitude towards the truth of 
the proposition. This can be seen by noting that while I can be 
said to have or lack faith that you will quit smoking, I can’t 
appropriately be said to have or lack faith that you will 
continue smoking. (2014, 53) 
 
Positivity theory is taken to be supported by (a) because genuine faith 
appears to go along with a positive evaluation of its object. Examples of 
(b) are particularly prominent in discussion of propositional faith and point 
up differences between faith that p and other propositional attitudes, in 
particular belief. Alston’s example of the difference between faith and 
belief that democracy will triumph is a case in point. Faith that p, it seems, 
must have an extra ‘positive’ property not necessary for mere belief that p.  
As is clear from the quotations above, the arguments for positivity theory 
employ two different types of evidence. Some arguments (c) use examples 
of faith and related attitudes to bolster intuitions about the kind of thing 
that faith is, while others (d) appeal to considerations about linguistic 
felicity. Buchak and Kaufmann, for instance, emphasise the oddity of 
saying that someone has faith if they don’t also have a positive attitude 
toward the object. Alston appeals to either (c) or (d) considerations: it is 
‘somewhere between inapt and false’ to say that S has faith that democracy 
will triumph if S does not see that prospect favourably. The strategy of (d), 
we take it, is that if there is something linguistically amiss with 
representing someone as having faith without an associated positive 
attitude, that supports the conclusion that the positivity is built into our 
concept of faith.7 
 
We think that (c) is a more compelling strategy than (d). First, as Malcolm 
and Scott (2017) point out, it is questionable not only whether judgements 
made by hearers about linguistic felicity offer reliable evidence for a 
philosophical theory about the nature of faith, but also whether hearers are 
expressing linguistic intuitions rather than theoretical presuppositions.8 
Second, and more directly, the assumption that the proposed statements 
about faith are infelicitous seems to us unpersuasive. Take Buchak’s and 
Kafumann’s claims that  
 
7. I have faith that you will continue smoking  
 
7 The notion of linguistic felicity is not fully spelled out by proponents of these arguments. It appears 
to be determined by the evaluation, by competent speakers of a language, that a given sentence of that 
language is ill-formed or does not make sense. 
8 For a review of the many challenges in unpicking facts about meaning from the judgments of speakers 
about linguistic felicity see Novek (2018). An empirically informed investigation into talk of faith, of 
the kind conducted in experimental pragmatics, is an intriguing but as yet unexplored prospect. 
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8. I have faith that I have cancer 
 
are linguistically infelicitous. We agree that these are unusual things to say 
(indeed, sufficiently unusual that a hearer might reasonably ask ‘don’t you 
mean believe rather than have faith?’) but that is because what they are 
saying is so unusual rather than because there is something wrong with the 
utterances. Even by the positivity theorist’s own lights these utterances 
could be true, provided that the speaker has a positive attitude towards the 
hearer’s continuing to smoke or the speaker’s having cancer. It might be 
morally or prudentially inappropriate to assert (7) or (8) but neither are 
linguistically infelicitous. Alston proposes that 
 
9. S has faith that universal democracy will triumph but is strongly 
opposed to it 
 
is inapt. But this does not seem to involve any linguistic mistake even if 
(assuming Alston is right and faith necessarily involves a pro-attitude) S 
cannot have the combination of attitudes described by (9). Alston would 
presumably wish to maintain that we can understand (9) to argue that it is 
saying something untrue. Indeed, this may be his point: (9) is inapt not in 
the sense that its meaning is unclear or that it deploys a misuse of language 
but that it is obviously untrue. For these reasons, we take (c) to offer the 
most promising way of arguing for PT.9 
 
 
3. Faith without Positivity 
 
Having considered what positivity is and the arguments for the positivity 
theory, is PT true? We believe that faith often goes along with a positive 
attitude but that the connection is contingent rather than necessary. That is, 
we support the more modest theory: 
 
(PT*): Faith is usually but contingently accompanied by 
positive attitudes towards its object or content. 
 
We will flesh out the details of this contingent relationship later in the 
paper; our focus here is on whether the necessary connection between faith 
and positive attitudes is defensible. In this section we will set out several 
counterexamples to PT; in the following we will look at two ways of 
revising PT to accommodate these counterexamples. Space considerations 
 
9 The case for PT is sometimes advanced alongside one for faith internalism (Audi 2011, 67; Howard-
Snyder 2019, 3). However, as we have seen, these are independent theories; we will return to the 
connections between them in section four. 
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limit the range and number of counterexamples we can give, and we have 
found in discussion that interlocutors vary in how intuitively appealing 
they find the given putative examples of faith. Our aim, therefore, is to 
raise doubts for the reader about the simplicity or necessity of a relation 
between faith and positivity and to motivate consideration of an alternative 
account. 
 
A commonplace observation about faith is that it is frequently 
accompanied by misgivings, either about the object or content of faith. 
Faith can be difficult to maintain and is often talked about as something 
that individuals struggle with. This aspect of faith has been a focus of 
discussion in recent papers in the field (not least by some of the supporters 
of positivity theory), with most attention being given to how faith is 
maintained in the face of doubt (Pojman 1986; Schellenberg 2005; 
Howard-Snyder 2013; McKaughan 2013, 2018). We find similar 
considerations raised in historical and theological treatments of religious 
faith. According to one recent survey of religious faith, “[d]oubt emerged 
as inevitable, as concomitant to faith, occasionally a virtue, more often as 
a struggle, an ailment to be overcome” (Andrews 2016, 2). However, the 
kinds of misgivings that go along with faith clearly extend beyond doubts 
about the truth of one’s faith.10 Religious faith may be clouded by despair, 
torment, anger, feelings of abandonment, sadness and dark nights of the 
soul. As McKaughan (2018) has demonstrated, such feelings were widely 
felt and documented by Mother Theresa. For instance, in her personal 
diaries from around 1961 she writes, 
 
Since [19]49 or [19]50 this terrible sense of loss—this untold 
darkness—this loneliness this continual longing for God—
which gives me that pain deep down in my heart—Darkness is 
such that I really do not see—neither with my mind nor with 
my reason—the place of God in my soul is blank—There is no 
God in me—when the pain of longing is so great—I just long 
& long for God—and then it is that I feel—He does not want 
me—He is not there. (Kolodiejchuk 2007, 349) 
 
More generally, it seems, during a crisis of faith, that negative feelings 
about the content or object of faith can come to the fore while positive 
feelings and judgments can go into abeyance, even if only for brief periods. 
The insistence on positivity as a necessary condition for faith seems at odds 
with this view about crises of faith. Moreover, crises of faith are not only 
restricted to religious cases. For example, one can continue to have faith in 
a person who engages in frustrating and self-destructive behaviour, even 
 
10 For some recent empirical data see Dura-Vila (2016). 
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though this behaviour may cause one to doubt the merits of one’s faith and 
to feel anger towards and disappointment in that person. 
 
The problem presented for PT by crises of faith is straightforward: faith in 
crisis can become detached, if only briefly, from positive evaluations or 
beliefs about the object or content of that faith. We do not, however, regard 
these cases as losses of faith. Indeed, faith is often seen as helping one to 
get through such crises. This does not, of course, establish that there is no 
connection between faith and positive evaluations. It does show, however, 
that PT as it stands is untenable. Faith is not indefatigably positive: it may 
endure even when positive attitudes about the object or content of faith are 
in abeyance. 
  
If objectual and propositional faith is possible without a positive attitude 
when faith is in crisis, can they also come apart in less challenging 
circumstances? Consider the following example. 
 
[A] Ellis is travelling to a conference in Shanghai where he is 
due to deliver a presentation. Ellis does not know the country 
and his flight schedule leaves him little time to get from the 
airport to the conference venue. But his old friend Thomas, 
who works in China, has agreed to pick him up at the airport to 
drive him to the event. Ellis, who regards Thomas not only a 
good friend but also a conscientious person, has faith in 
Thomas to be there to collect him on time and get him to the 
conference (as well as propositional faith that Thomas will do 
these things). Over the course of the flight, however, Ellis spots 
a major problem with the presentation, one that he cannot clear 
up in the time he has. If only, Ellis thinks, Thomas could slack 
off on this occasion and be a little late and I could miss the 
presentation slot and save the embarrassment of a poor 
presentation. He retains his faith with respect to Thomas 
collecting him and getting him to the venue on time but he 
neither believes these would be good things, nor does he desire 
them. 
 
If the positivity theory is right, Ellis should have lost his faith in Thomas 
over the course of the flight. But this does not seem right. In key respects 
Ellis’ attitudes and dispositions are unchanged. He has not undergone loss 
of confidence in Thomas: he stills expects Thomas to be there on time, he 
has not made any alternative plans so still relies on Thomas to be there on 
time. It is simply that, with respect to some things that Ellis has faith in 
Thomas to do, he has changed his evaluation of their merit: he doesn’t 
positively evaluate Thomas’ timeliness in this context. Ellis’ hope that 
Finlay Malcolm and Michael Scott: True Grit and Positivity of Faith 
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Thomas be late is perhaps unfair to Thomas since Ellis’ predicament is his 
own fault, but it seems possible. Ellis might even say things like: ‘While I 
have full faith in Thomas to pick me up from the airport and get me to the 
conference on time, I hope he doesn’t’. We would be puzzled if Ellis said: 
‘Since looking again at my presentation, I’ve totally lost faith in Thomas 
getting me to the venue on time’. More generally, faith can persevere even 
though one’s positive attitudes about its content or object do not. Contrary 
to PT, it seems possible to have faith in s x-ing (or faith that s xs) while 
lacking a positive attitude toward the object or content.  
 
Consider two further, connected examples: 
 
[B] Silvia has faith that the Biblical miracle stories are true. 
However, she has always been troubled by the story of the 
Miracle at Cana. She does not understand why Jesus would 
have transformed water into wine; it seems to her a pointless 
exercise. Moreover, she disapproves of drunkenness and the 
encouragement thereof. She retains her faith that Jesus 
transformed water into wine at Cana, along with her faith in the 
other miracle stories, despite neither believing that it was a 
good thing to do nor approving of it. 
 
[C] Ryan has faith that the teachings of his church are based on 
the word of God.  However, he finds some of these teachings a 
struggle, in particular those related to the sinfulness of 
homosexuality. This is because Ryan is coming to terms with 
the fact that he is gay. Ryan has faith that the church’s 
teachings on homosexuality are true but he does not look on 
them with any favour; he certainly does not desire them to be 
true, nor, given his own experiences, does he understand how 
God could will them. Nevertheless, his faith holds.  
 
Silvia, insofar as she has a view of the content of her faith, considers the 
miracle ethically dubious. Ryan struggles with his faith and is unable to 
look positively on some aspects of it. Both are examples of faith without 
DIS. The cases are connected because they trade on the fact that faith is 
often directed towards a body of propositions to which agents are 
committed, rather than just one. Religious faith may encompass numerous 
propositions, sometimes codified in creeds, commitment to which are 
considered important to membership in a religious tradition. Political 
systems, particularly those associated with revolutionary movements, 
provide another example. In such cases, the agent may not view all of the 
requisite propositions with the same favourable attitude; some may be seen 
either neutrally but taken on trust as among the requisite commitments of 
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the political position. Faith that p, that q, that r, etc., therefore seems 
possible without a positive attitude towards all of the propositions in 
question. 
 
Consider one more example: 
 
[D] Martha has faith that those people that God does not save 
will go to Hell and that such decisions are predestined. She 
does not claim to understand how this arrangement can be just 
or good; her faith is such that she eschews questions about its 
merits or thinking through its ethical implications. Nor does 
she desire it to be true; indeed, her feelings towards this are 
closer to dread, not least in case she should be among those 
who are not saved. 
 
Martha’s faith is not in crisis; she has not had her positive attitudes 
challenged or upset. Indeed, Martha might never have seen predestination 
in a positive light but as an incomprehensible mystery, or as an inescapable 
fact of religious reality about which she makes no evaluative judgement. 
Her faith is manifested by her resolute conviction that this is part of a 
religious reality, and that this conviction manifests in her life and thinking, 
rather than her approving of it. Moreover, her lack of a positive stance 
might be deliberate: she intends to refrain from forming an evaluative 
appraisal of predestination because she thinks it at best a pointless or at 
worst inappropriately presumptive attitude on her part.  
 
In some of these cases – notably Silvia and Ryan – it seems possible that 
their attitudes towards the object or content of their faith is conflicted. For 
example, perhaps Silvia has a negative attitude to 
 
10. Jesus transformed water into wine. 
 
while also having other positive attitudes towards the proposition. 
According to PT, faith that p requires desire or approval of p, or a belief 
that p is desirable or good; PT does not say that faith that p is incompatible 
with non-positive attitudes towards p. So, the examples can be brought into 
line with PT by assuming that positive attitudes are also in play.  
 
We agree that individuals can be conflicted in this way, most clearly in the 
case of desires. Silvia might approve of Jesus’ miraculous intervention at 
Cana while also disapproving of what he did. We also agree that if this is 
how things are with Silvia, then PT is consistent with the example. 
However, PT claims a necessary connection between faith and positive 
attitudes about its object or content. So, for the conflict defence to work, 
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Silvia – along with individuals in any number of similar cases – must be 
conflicted. This, it seems to us, is less plausible than PT* without 
independent argument. Silvia may be conflicted, and this may be the most 
probable explanation of her attitude, but it does not seem necessary that 
she approve of (10) alongside her misgivings about it.  
 
PT therefore runs into a number of problem cases. It seems that faith need 
not be accompanied by positive attitudes either when undergoing a crisis 
of faith or in much more mundane circumstances (such as [A]); positive 
attitudes need not extend to all contents or objects of one’s faith (as in [B] 
and [C]); faith also seems possible in cases where a positive attitude may 
not even be seen by the agent as appropriate (as in [D]). 
 
 
4. Modest Positivity Theory 
 
We have indicated our preference for PT* which posits a contingent 
connection between faith and positive attitudes. But is there a more modest 
version of PT that is compatible with the counterexamples but retains the 
necessary link between faith and positivity? There seem to us two main 
options. 
 
First, positivity theorists could attempt to find a more attenuated necessary 
connection between faith and positive attitudes towards its content or 
object. The onus is on the positivity theorist to flesh out the details of this 
connection. But since nobody has yet attempted this modification, and with 
a view to being constructive, here is a proposal of refined positivity theory: 
 
(RPT) Necessarily, if R has faith that p (or in s) then R desires 
that p (or approves of s) or believes that p is good (or that s is 
good), or some relevantly connected faith judgement is 
accompanied by a desire or approval of its content or object or 
belief that its content or object is good. 
 
This formulation is modelled on attempts to refine motivational 
internalism in metaethics, which are perhaps an object lesson in the 
difficulties of finding plausible attenuated necessary connections (see 
Björklund et al. 2012). The central idea behind RPT is that while there may 
be cases of individuals with faith that p (or in s) without a corresponding 
positive attitude towards p (or s), they must have a positive attitude to some 
proposition or object closely related to p (or s). For example, Ellis may not 
think positively about Thomas’ getting him to the venue on time, but he 
presumably does regard Thomas’ timeliness or at least more generally 
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Thomas’ organisational abilities favourably. Is RPT, or something like it, 
defensible? 
 
An initial problem for RPT is to specify what makes faith relevantly 
connected to a positive attitude. Suppose that Ellis has a high regard for 
Thomas’ abilities as a cook and eagerly anticipates the culinary feast that 
Thomas will lay on for him. Ellis therefore appears to have a positive 
attitude that is connected to his faith in Thomas’ timeliness, since both are 
concerned with his prospective meeting with Thomas. However, this is 
presumably not a relevant connection since his feelings about Thomas’ 
cooking should not have a bearing on whether he has faith in Thomas’ 
timeliness. Supporters of RPT will need to specify more closely the 
‘relevant connection’ to avoid these problems. Second, RPT comes at a 
significant cost to plausibility. Once the positivity theorist has conceded 
that the arguments for PT considered in section one are unsuccessful, and 
that there are counterexamples to these theories, why continue to maintain 
that there is a distant necessary connection rather than conceding that there 
is no necessary connection at all? Third, there is an alternative to RPT 
compatible with the counterexamples that preserves the intuition that faith 
and positive attitudes are closely related: that there is a regular but 
contingent connection between faith and a positive attitude towards its 
content or object, i.e. PT*. This would account for the fact that we expect 
faith to be positive and that it usually is, while allowing that under certain 
circumstances it is not. Notably, the exploration of causal links between 
faith and positive attitudes has been the focus of a growing body of 
empirical investigation (Ögtem-Young 2018, Pargament 2010, and 
Pargament and Cummings 2010). We will say more about philosophical 
accounts of faith that make this relationship plausible in the following 
section.  
 
It is useful to consider a specific way of developing an answer to the first 
objection, i.e. specifying the relevant connection needed for RPT. An 
appealing way of doing this is to posit a relationship between propositional 
and objectual faith.11 Take the example of Ellis. While he may not have a 
positive attitude towards the proposition that Thomas will get him to the 
venue on time, it is plausible that his propositional faith is based on faith 
in Thomas (or in Thomas’ reliability), and that he thinks favourably of 
Thomas (or of Thomas’ reliability). Similarly, while Martha may not have 
a positive attitude toward the proposition that the afterlife is predestined, 
she may have faith in the authority that inspired her propositional faith (the 
church, the Bible, God, etc.) and have a favourable attitude towards it. This 
suggests the following approach to defending refined positivity theory: in 
 
11 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this journal for suggesting this example. 
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cases where agents with propositional faith appear to lack a positive 
attitude towards the proposition in question, the propositional faith is based 
on an objectual faith with a content that is viewed positively.  
 
The proposed ways of expanding the examples of Ellis and Martha to 
include objectual faith are plausible: their propositional faith may be 
inspired by objectual faith and, moreover, they may have a positive attitude 
associated with their objectual faith that they lack towards the proposition. 
This is, however, compatible with our preferred theory PT*, i.e. that faith 
is usually but only contingently associated with positive attitudes. A 
defence of PT or RPT will need to posit a necessary connection between 
propositional and objectual faith, that is, (non-positive) propositional faith 
is not merely causally related to (positive) objectual faith, but the former 
requires the latter.  This is certainly not self-evident. If we look more 
broadly at the literature on faith, there is little, if any support for the view 
that there is a necessary relation between objectual and propositional faith. 
One potentially sympathetic voice in favour of the dependency of 
propositional faith on objectual faith is William Alston: ‘It seems plausible 
that wherever it is clearly appropriate to attribute “faith that,” there is a 
“faith in” in the background’ (1996, 13). However, Alston appears to take 
the connection between propositional and objectual faith to be causal rather 
than necessary. Moreover, he offers this remark as an intuition about 
propositional faith rather than a substantive theory that he aims to defend. 
Making progress with the proposed defence of positivity theory, therefore, 
will require new arguments for dependency relations between 
propositional and objectual faith, which are yet to be forthcoming.  
 
There is another fallback position available to positivity theory. This is to 
revise the account of the positive valence of faith whereby the positivity of 
faith is effectively guaranteed by faith internalism. As we saw in section 
two, if faith internalism (and Humean psychology) is true, then if R has 
faith that p (or in s), R will have some desire-like state that will dispose her 
to in some way act on that faith. Now, if faith that p (or in s) has this effect 
on R’s plans and objectives, p and s make a difference to R. They make a 
difference for R because if R did not have faith that p or in s (or had faith 
in some other proposition or object) R would be differently motivated. To 
this extent, p or s matter to R. Accordingly faith internalism goes along 
with the following theory: 
 
IPT (Internalist positivity theory): Necessarily, if R has faith 
that p or in s then p or s matter to R. 
 
This, of course, is only tenuously a ‘positivity’ theory: it falls far short of 
the requirements of PT. The object or content of faith matters to R only in 
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the sense that they make a difference to what she is motivated to do. As we 
saw in section two, this requires neither that R’s motivating attitude is 
about the content or object of faith, nor that the attitude that motivates R is 
positive in the sense given by PT. Nevertheless, IPT does preserve a 
necessary connection between faith and some notion of positivity. 
 
To see the potential appeal of IPT, it is useful to consider an argument from 
Howard-Snyder about the connection between faith and what we care 
about: 
 
one cannot have faith that something is so without at least some 
tendency to feel disappointment upon learning that it’s not so. 
That’s because one can have faith that something is so only if 
one cares that it is so; and one can care that something is so 
only if one has some tendency to feel disappointment upon 
learning that it’s not so. (Howard-Snyder 2013, 360) 
 
Now, the connection between caring and a disposition to feel 
disappointment, offered here as a priori, seems to us misplaced. In some of 
the examples we considered in section three (notably Ellis and at least 
some examples of those with crises of faith) the connection looks doubtful. 
Here are two more examples. Suppose my son enters the sack jumping race 
at a local fete. I have faith that he is going to win. However, I learn that the 
prize for second place – a chocolate dinosaur – would please him far more 
than the Snakes & Ladders game reserved for the winner (a copy of which 
he already has). He comes in second. Am I disappointed? Not even a little 
bit. This isn’t because I didn’t care that he would win while he was in the 
race or lacked faith that he would win. Rather, when he came in second, I 
ceased to have those attitudes and felt delighted (and maybe a little 
relieved) that he secured the prize he would prefer. Second, suppose I 
support a minor English football team at the low end of the National 
League. I recognise their many weaknesses but nevertheless have faith that 
they will manage to stay in the league and avoid relegation. It turns out that 
this does not happen. Instead, through a serious of extraordinary victories 
they secure a place in the higher English Football League. Am I disposed 
to be disappointed that they didn’t stay in the same league? Clearly not. I 
am delighted they did even better than I had faith that they would.  
 
Our point in drawing attention to Howard-Snyder’s argument, however, is 
not for the connection he makes between faith and disappointment but the 
one between faith and caring. This connection is intuitively plausible but 
can be secured by IPT rather than PT: agents with faith care about the 
content or object of their faith because it matters to them. It matters because 
the content or object of their faith makes a difference to their motivations 
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and what they plan to do. IPT, therefore, preserves an intuitive connection 
between faith and what the agent cares about.  
 
IPT offers a viable fallback position by conceding the problematic aspects 
of PT, i.e., that the agent with faith requires a positive attitude towards the 
object or content of faith. As such, IPT escapes the counterexamples 
considered in section three that target this feature of PT. However, the 
‘positivity’ of faith proposed by IPT derives from its impact on the 
motivational profile of agents that have faith. As such, IPT glosses faith 
internalism. Even if IPT is true, therefore, PT* is still needed to account 
for the connection between faith and one’s approvals or positive evaluative 
judgements of the object or content of faith. 
 
 
5. Faith and True Grit  
 
We have argued that PT is false and instead endorsed (a) PT*, which posits 
a contingent connection between faith and positive attitudes, and (b) IPT, 
which connects faith and what matters to the agent with faith, in a way that 
follows from faith internalism. In this concluding section we will focus on 
some widely recognised, necessary properties of faith – that we will call 
true grit – that explain why faith should usually go along with positive 
attitudes, that is, why we would expect PT* to be true. We will also argue 
that the examples considered in section two that purportedly lent support 
to PT can be explained by true grit rather than necessarily being 
accompanied by a positive attitude.12  
 
As a starting point, it seems platitudinous that faith is not fickle. Someone 
who has faith that p or faith in s does not give up on s or reject p on the 
least reason to do so. Even if it is not acted on, a disinclination to give up 
on the object of faith seems one of the minimal necessary requirements for 
either objectual or propositional faith. Unsurprisingly, this idea shows up 
in most theories of faith, albeit under various guises: Bishop (2007), for 
instance, talks of ‘commitment’, Buchak (2017) ‘steadfastness’, Howard-
Snyder (2013) ‘resilience’, Kvanvig (2013) ‘retention’, Malcolm and Scott 
(2017) ‘resistance’, Matheson (2018) ‘grit’, and McKaughan (2018) 
‘perseverance’. One cannot have faith without in some way and to some 
extent sticking with the object of faith. Can we specify this disposition in 
a less metaphorical way, while preserving its platitudinousness?  
 
 
12 To the best of our knowledge, the expression grit, and the psychological literature associated with it 
(Duckworth et al. 2007), was first connected with the resilience of faith in a workshop presentation by 
Malcolm (2017). The first published work to make the connection was Matheson (2018). 
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It is useful to consider a comparable literature in the social sciences where 
the notions of grit and, in particular, resilience have been explored (for 
recent overviews, see Bourbeau 2018; Jacelon 1997; Luthar et al. 2000; 
and Stewart and Yuen 2011), as well as where the connections between 
faith and resilience have been to the fore (see Pargament 2010; Pargament 
and Cummings 2010; Ögtem-Young 2018). This literature has admitted 
several characterisations of resilience, four of which look particularly 
relevant: the ability of an agent to ‘bounce back’ from a setback (Block 
and Thomas 1955), to ‘adapt’ to challenging circumstances by changing 
various attitudes and behaviours (Zautra et al. 2010), to ‘persist’ or exhibit 
‘staying power’ (Masten et al. 1990), and to ‘resist’ the challenges 
presented by adverse circumstances (Rutter 2006). How might these be 
applied to psychological attitudes such as faith? Suppose an agent S has 
some attitude A under circumstances C that challenge or provide a reason 
for her to not have that attitude. The four characterisations of resilience 
suggest four corresponding ways in which S might be resilient with respect 
to A in C: 
 
i. Bouncing Back: S is disposed to regain A after its loss as a result of 
C.  
ii. Adaptation: S is disposed to modify her thinking and other attitudes 
to retain A in response to C that would otherwise cause her not to 
have A.  
iii. Persistence: S is disposed to persist in exhibiting A in C.  
iv. Resistance: S is disposed to resist, at least to some extent, factors that 
would lead her to cease having A. 
 
Faith could exhibit resilience in any of these ways. Suppose, for instance, 
I have faith in a friend’s honesty, but I am presented with compelling 
evidence that he has acted dishonestly. Even if I lose my faith for a while, 
I may be (i) disposed to regain it later, or I may be (ii) inclined to change 
other attitudes – such as my views about the credibility of the source of the 
challenging evidence – to preserve my faith, or I may be (iii) disposed to 
continue to voice my conviction that my friend is honest in the face of this 
contrary evidence, or I may be simply (iv) disposed to be unpersuaded by 
that evidence (at least up to a point). 
 
There is much more to say about the merits of these analyses of resilience 
but since our focus is on faith, it is (iv) – the resistance analysis – that 
seems to us the most promising. There are two reasons for this. First, (iv) 
is the least demanding of the four analyses: anybody who rebounds, adapts 
or persists in their attitudes in C thereby satisfies (iv) by resisting factors 
that would undermine A. Indeed, (i), (ii) and (iii) can each be seen as ways 
of resisting C: by adaptation, resistance or rebounding. Second, (i), (ii) and 
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(iii) each face counterexamples. Someone might lose their faith without 
any inclination to regain it: ‘I used to have faith in democracy as the best 
political system but after the political turbulence of last couple of years 
I’ve given up on the idea’. Similarly, while (ii) and (iii) – adaptation and 
persistence – may often characterise faith, neither one seems necessary. I 
may maintain my faith in a sports team but substantially change the manner 
in which I voice and act on that faith after my team undergoes a crushing 
defeat. I thereby adapt but do not persist in my earlier behaviours. In 
contrast, my faith may exhibit a degree of persistence but not be adaptable. 
I may be disposed to continue enthusiastically to support my team after 
various defeats, but not disposed to adapt my behaviour and attitudes to 
preserve my faith in the event of a major loss. So, in general, (iv) is 
successful because it does not restrict the ways in which S may be disposed 
to resist C with respect to her faith. The concept of resistance – discussed 
in the social sciences but hitherto not explicitly considered in philosophy 
– provides us with a helpfully minimal analysis of the kind of resilience 
that faith is widely taken to exhibit. 
 
Can we say more about the challenging circumstances C? Discussion has 
tended to focus in particular on counterevidence to the truth of the 
propositional content of faith (Howard-Snyder 2013, 367-68; Buchak 
2017; Matheson 2018; McKaughan 2018), less so on non-epistemic factors 
(though see examples from Howard-Snyder 2017 for non-epistemic 
examples of resilience).13 But faith goes along with resisting practical and 
psychological challenges. Consider, for instance, the demands of having 
faith in a society in which public expressions of faith are liable to be met 
with persecution and mistreatment. Sustaining faith in such a context 
incurs a practical cost: it is difficult to do and carries with it significant 
risks. This is, of course, a somewhat extreme case; faith does not have to 
be so resilient that it persists even under these circumstances. However, 
faith must be able to withstand some practical costs: one does not have 
faith in someone if one is disposed to defame them in exchange for an Oreo 
Bar. Additionally, one can have faith in someone who behaves in an 
exasperating and emotionally wearing manner. Again, faith need not 
require a heroic degree of determination and steeliness. But it does need to 
exhibit some degree of resistance to psychological pressures. One does not 
have faith that democracy is good if one is disposed to change one’s mind 
about it because of the tiresome and provocative behaviour of one 
democratically elected leader. In general, faith disposes the faithful agent 
 
13 In the social psychology literature on ‘grit’, Duckworth et al. (2007) point to non-epistemic factors, 
but when grit is addressed in recent analytic philosophy, the focus is clearly on resisting epistemic 
reasons (Morton and Paul 2019). 
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to withstand practical, emotional and psychological costs as well as 
contrary evidence.14  
 
Since we are looking for a minimal, widely acceptable, and necessary 
property of faith, we will remain pluralists about the specification of the 
attitude of faith itself. For example, on a doxastic theory of propositional 
faith, faith disposes the agent to resist pressures (evidential, practical or 
psychological) to disbelieve the propositional content of faith; on a 
nondoxastic theory (e.g. Alston 1996) the attitude in question may be 
acceptance. On a trust theory of objectual faith (e.g. McKaughan 2016), 
the attitude will be a disposition to resist evidential, practical or 
psychological factors to break one’s trust with the object of faith; on the 
theory that objectual faith is a goal-directed attitude (e.g. Kvanvig 2013), 
the agent will resist evidential, practical and emotional pressures to give 
up on that objective. We will remain neutral on these contentious areas of 
debate.   
 
Drawing the elements of this theory together, we propose that it is 
necessary that faith disposes the agent to resist, to some extent, giving up 
on the object or content of faith (be it trust of or allegiance to the object, or 
a belief or support of the proposition, etc.) in response to epistemic, 
psychological or practical pressures to do so. For convenience we will call 
this property of faith true grit.15 Faith is true in the sense that it exhibits an 
allegiance or attachment to the object or content of faith (which may be 
characterised differently as belief, acceptance, trust, commitment, etc.); it 
is gritty in the sense that it is a disposition to resist (to some extent) 
challenging circumstances that would undermine that allegiance or 
attachment.  
 
True grit is a distinct property from the positivity of faith. Someone with 
true grit is undeterred in their commitments by evidential, practical and 
psychological factors but they are not thereby invariably positive in their 
attitudes about the object or content of their faith. One may exhibit true grit 
without approving of or having a positive evaluative belief about the object 
of faith. On the other hand, a positive attitude toward p (or about s) and 
true grit commonly go along with each other, as PT* predicts. The most 
 
14 Although it is not central to our argument, the notion of contrary evidence needs more careful 
handling than it is sometimes given. If I have access to incontrovertible evidence that p is true I will 
be unmoved by counterevidence to this belief. However, we usually take faith to be characterised by 
resistance to counterevidence that is not counterbalanced by the evidential resources at the agent’s 
disposal. (For more discussion of the idea that faith ‘goes beyond the evidence’, see Buchak 2012; 
Malcolm 2020). 
15 We use this well-worn expression not with the aim of making a connection with established theories 
of grit in the social science, or existing accounts of faith that focus on grit as a salient property, but 
simply as a familiar expression to cover the minimal properties of faith that we are positing. 
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straightforward way in which someone might have true grit towards an 
object or proposition is to desire or positively evaluate that object or the 
truth of that proposition, where these desires and beliefs have a causal role 
in sustaining one’s resistance to circumstances C. For example, the 
resilience needed for faith that God will save us will be strengthened by 
the desire that God will save us or the judgement that this is a valuable 
thing. Positive attitudes towards the object or content of faith bolster one’s 
resistance reasons to give up on that object or disbelieve that content. The 
true grit of faith, therefore, fits well with PT*.  
 
Can true grit also explain the examples used to support PT? Let us take 
three. First, why do we find cases of faith like (11) but not like (12)? 
 
11. Peter has faith that Franz will give up smoking. 
12. Peter has faith that Franz will continue smoking. 
 
Buchak proposes that the absence of a positive attitude towards Franz 
continuing to smoke explains the difference. But this isn’t convincing. 
Suppose that Peter wishes Franz ill and believes that Franz’s death would 
be a good thing; suppose he also believes that Franz’s continuing to smoke 
raises the chances of this happening. Even with the requisite positive 
desires and beliefs in place, that Franz will continue to smoke still looks 
like an odd thing for Peter to have faith about. True grit does better: it is 
the peculiarity of someone having an attitude of true grit towards Franz 
continuing to smoke that accounts for why (12) seems an odd candidate for 
faith. The circumstances in which (12) might be true are ones in which 
Peter persists, for example, in maintaining that Franz will continue to 
smoke despite evidence that he has given up. That is, where Peter exhibits 
the true grit he needs for faith.  
 
Why do we find instances of faith like (13) but not (14)? 
  
13. I have faith that I will give up smoking. 
14. I have faith that I will continue smoking. 
 
Not, it seems, because of anything to do with positivity. There is nothing 
unusual about a desire to smoke nor, unfortunately, about a desire to 
continue to smoke. So, the presence or absence of a positive attitude does 
not explain why (14) is an odd case. True grit does. To commit to give up 
smoking, for many, requires resolve in the face of a variety of pressures: 
putting aside the evidence of past failures to stop, determination to give up 
despite the nagging need to smoke; practical avoidance of circumstances 
in which one will be tempted to change one’s mind. In contrast (14), except 
under unusual circumstances, is not a suitable subject of true grit. Indeed, 
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it is the reverse: typically, someone doesn’t need any resilience to believe 
that they will continue to smoke since they just need to give in to it.  
 
Why do we find instances like (15) but not (16)? 
 
15. Peter has faith that he will survive cancer. 
16. Peter has faith that he will die of cancer. 
 
According to the positivity theory, it is because the latter, unlike the 
former, is not something about which an agent usually has a positive 
attitude. Equally, however, the proposition that one will die of cancer is 
not usually something that people take a gritty attitude towards. For 
example, we do not usually find someone determined to uphold the 
judgement that they have cancer in the face of evidence that the diagnosis 
should be overturned. In contrast, we do find agents that have cancer with 
a gritty attitude towards their survival. For example, someone may be 
disposed to persist with this attitude when confronted with increasingly 
negative prognoses and the practical and emotional challenges that come 
with the worsening condition.   
 
Now, it could be objected that we often find people who commit to gloomy 
assessments, of which Peter’s judgement in (16) is an extreme case, and 
are gritty in maintaining those assessments. They are pessimists. Doesn’t 
this show that we still need to appeal to positivity to explain why such 
pessimistic commitments do not count as faith? Not so. First, there is 
nothing about pessimistic judgements that requires they should be gritty. 
For example, someone who favours pessimistic beliefs or assumptions 
simply because they think those beliefs are true or those assumptions 
prudent, does not thereby hold to those beliefs or assumptions grittily. The 
kind of pessimistic judgement that satisfies true grit is less commonplace. 
The gritty pessimist would be disposed to, for example, disregard plausible 
contrary evidence to their beliefs, persist with the beliefs in the face of 
emotional and practical pressures to adopt less gloomy judgements, and so 
on. Second, PT does not exclude individuals from having faith in 
pessimistic beliefs: PT is a constraint on the kinds of attitudes required for 
faith, not on their content. For example, someone may form a pessimistic 
judgement about the future but also desire or in some way to approve of 
that outcome. Notably, for the reasons already given for the connection 
between true grit and positivity, we should expect that someone who is 
gritty in their pessimistic judgements will regard them positively. Neither 
true grit nor PT, therefore, exclude the possibility of faith in pessimistic 
judgments. 
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Another purported advantage of the positivity theory is that a positive 
attitude distinguishes merely believing something from having faith in it. 
A difference between belief in ghosts and faith in ghosts, or between belief 
and faith that Trump will win a second term in 2024, is that the faith 
attitudes must be accompanied by a positive view of their objects. Here 
too, the true grit theory provides a simpler explanation of the contrasting 
cases without needing to appeal to positivity. For example, to have faith in 
ghosts or faith that Trump will win a second term in 2024 requires true grit 
– that is to resist a variety of countervailing considerations – whereas belief 
in these matters can be surrendered merely on the basis of evidence that it 
is not true. 
 
These considerations suggest that even if we put aside the objections to PT, 
the appeal to positivity as an explanation of the examples used to support 
PT may be dispensable in favour of one that appeals to true grit. Moreover, 
in some examples, such as (11) and (12), true grit appears to provide a 
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